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Executive Report on Strategies in China
ICON Group International, June 2007, Pages: 390
How to Strategically Evaluate China
Perhaps the most efficient way of evaluating China is to consider key dimensions which themselves are composites of multiple factors. Composite portfolio approaches have long been used by strategic planners. The biggest challenge in this approach is to choose the appropriate factors that are the most relevant to international planning. The two measures of greatest relevance are “latent demand” and “market accessibility”. The figure below summarizes the key dimensions and recommendations of such an approach. Using these two composites, one can prioritize all countries of the world. Countries of high latent demand and high relative accessibility (e.g. easier entry for one firm compared to other firms) are given highest priority. The figure below shows two different scenarios. Accessibility is defined as a firm’s ease of entering or supplying from or to a market (the “supply side”), and latent demand is an indicator of the potential in serving from or to the market (the “demand side”).
Framework for Prioritizing Countries
Demand/Market Potential Driven Firm
Relative Accessibility
Accessibility/Supply Averse Firm
Relative Accessibility
In the top figure, the firm is driven by market potential, whereas the bottom figure represents a firm that is driven by costs or by an aversion to difficult markets. This report treats the reader as coming from a “generic firm” approaching the global market - neither a market-driven nor a cost-driven company. Planners must therefore augment this report with their own company-specific factors that might change the priorities.
Latent Demand and Accessibility in China
This report provides an extremely detailed overview of factors driving latent demand and accessibility in China. Latent demand is largely driven by economic fundamentals. But, latent demand only represents half of the picture. A country may at first sight appear to be attractive due to a high latent demand, but it is often less attractive when one considers at the macro level how easy it might be to serve that entire potential and/or general business risks.
Chapter 2 deals with macro-accessibility. While accessibility will always vary from one company to another for a given country, the following domains are typically considered when evaluating macro-accessibility in China:
Openness to Trade in China
Openness to Direct Investment in China
Local Marketing and Entry Strategy Alternatives
Local Human Resources
Local Risks
Across these domains, a number of not-so-obvious factors can affect accessibility and risk. These are also covered in Chapter 2, which is presented from the perspective of an American firm, though it is equally applicable to most firms entering China. This chapter has been authored by local offices of the U.S. Government. I have included a number of edits to clarify the provided information as it relates to the general strategic framework.
In Chapter 3, I summarize the economic potential for China over the next five years for hundreds of industries, categories, and products. The goal of this chapter is to report my findings on the real economic potential, or latent demand, represented by China when defined as an area of dominant influence. The data presented are the result of various spatial econometric and time-series forecasting models which, for each category presented, are applied to forecast and allocate latent demand across all countries of the world and major distribution centers or centers of dominant influence within each country. This is accomplished knowing that economic fundamentals (e.g. income) generally vary from one country to another within a given country over time. In this chapter, I report the allocation for each category for China as an area of dominant influence in Asia and, potentially, the world.
The report concludes with trade indicators for China. Often, the amount of trade flowing into and out of a country is a strong indicator of trading partners, trade openness, and related latent demand. Trade indicators are purely statistical in nature. Although international trade is not a direct measure of latent demand, it does provide an indicator of general market conditions with respect to trade flows and trade openness in China.
As a whole, this report presents a strategic assessment of China by considering an extremely broad set of factors affecting both latent demand and accessibility, as outlined in the following chapters.
MACRO-ACCESSIBILITY IN CHINA
Government Intervention Risks
Although China’s private sector has grown tremendously since economic reforms began in 1979, state-owned or state-controlled entities continue to play the leading role in the Chinese economy. For example, traditional state-owned enterprises and corporations with majority of shares held by the state accounted for just under 42 percent of gross industrial output for the year. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party maintains its authority to oversee economic policies as well as managerial appointments in all financial institutions and major industrial enterprises. Although the authorities’ long-term plan is to sell all or part of the government share in most state-owned enterprises and financial institutions to the public, ultimate control over managers of these assets will remain in the hands of the Party. Leading officials and bureaucratic institutions also maintain substantial authority to approve or deny investment decisions by enterprises and individuals.
Although direct price controls on most commodities have been eliminated, prices for thirteen broad categories of items, including electric power, transportation, telecommunications, and some services, remain subject to varying degrees of government “guidance.” Petroleum prices have generally been allowed to fluctuate in accord with the international market. The government sets all interest rates and fees at financial institutions, distorting the cost of capital and preventing banks and other institutions from using interest rates as a way to adjust for risk.
Infrastructure Investment
Although the government is no longer explicitly pursuing a tight credit policy to quell inflation, its efforts to improve the asset quality of the state-owned banking system effectively limits the kinds of projects which receive official approval and which the banks will finance. Private firms, in particular, still have serious difficulties in raising capital. State-sponsored infrastructure projects are seen as “safe” investments for domestic financial organs. Financing for key projects comes from an increasing variety of sources, including special construction funds, surcharges on power and other utilities, provincial and local government budgets, as well as domestic loans from the China Development Bank and other banks.
Chinese officials have said they would prefer roughly 15-20 percent of infrastructure investment to come from foreign sources, but shifting foreign investment away from export-oriented industries presents some difficulties. Infrastructure investments have long payback periods, with no ready source of foreign exchange. Policies designed to attract foreign investment, notably those inspired by the central government’s “Great Western Development Strategy,” have tended to emphasize land-use and tax incentives without addressing more fundamental problems in the investment environment. China’s weak legal structure, failure to enforce contracts and court decisions, restricted access to foreign exchange, and the cumbersome approval process work against foreign participation in infrastructure projects, particularly in the road, rail and power sectors. The regulatory impediments to foreign involvement in infrastructure projects are gradually disappearing. For example, changes in rules governing current account transactions have gone a long way toward solving the problem of guaranteeing foreign exchange convertibility.
Infrastructure development in the telecommunications sector remains strong and China now boasts the largest wireline and wireless networks in the world. The Chinese Government’s policies have contributed to this growth. They have made telecom and IT development a national priority and enacted preferential policy initiatives to promote telecommunications modernization throughout the country. In addition, technological advances have contributed to network expansion by making better equipment available at lower prices.
Political Risks
Although there has been considerable reform of China’s economic model - from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one - the same is far less true of the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China) political system. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still dominates the entire political apparatus, and its leaders make all major policy decisions. Party members hold most senior government positions at all levels of administration. Ultimate authority rests with the 24 members of the CCP Politburo and, in particular, its nine-member Standing Committee. Ministries and lower-level counterparts implement policy on a day-to-day basis, and China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), reviews and approves legislation and nominees for government offices. Many provincial governments - especially those in fast-growing coastal regions - actively adapt central government policy decisions to suit local needs. Senior leaders generally agree on the need for further economic reform, but stability remains the paramount concern, and differences exist within the leadership over the content, pace, and goals of both economic and political reform.
China faces a growing disconnect between the demands of its reforming economy and society and a political system that is largely ill-suited to meet their needs. The growing disparity between urban and rural incomes, income gaps between the wealthy coastal regions and the poor interior, a large “floating population” of itinerant workers, mounting unemployment created as State-Owned Enterprises restructure and downsize, and official corruption are the chief potential threats to stability. So far, none has prompted the kind of mass protest movement that erupted in Beijing in the spring of 1989, although a number of localized large-scale labor protests occurred in 2002. The central authorities prefer to minimize tensions through the implementation of pragmatic policies. They also recognize that moves to reduce personal and economic freedoms would harm China’s long-term interests. Nonetheless, the national leadership would respond forcefully if confronted with what it regarded as another serious threat to its monopoly on political power, as it did after approximately 10,000 members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement appeared outside the leadership compound in Beijing in April 1999. As evidenced by harsh sentences handed down to labor activists and Internet dissidents in May and June 2003, the new leadership appears to be placing a strong emphasis on stability and perceived threats to power.
Political relations with the U.S. temporarily deteriorated following the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in May 1999 and again following the collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter in international airspace in April 2001. Bilateral relations have gradually recovered from both incidents. China came out firmly in support of the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Relations further improved with the October 2001 and February 2002 visits by President Bush to China and the October 2002 visit of then President Jiang Zemin to the United States. Differences, however, remain between the U.S. and Chinese governments on some political issues, such as nonproliferation and human rights, and these will continue to color the relationship.
Marketing Strategies
Distribution Channel Options
Before China’s accession to the WTO, China prohibited foreign companies from distributing imported products or providing repair and maintenance services. Since WTO implementation, China has worked towards liberalizing its distribution system to provide full distribution rights for U.S. firms. However, this is an issue still very much in debate and with much improvement to be made. Current restrictions for most distribution related services are to be phased-out within three years from the date of accession, although the schedule of commitment until that time remains according to the service, (for more information on China’s commitments on the WTO, please refer to the U.S. Embassy Web site links to the Economic Section and Trade and Commerce at: www.usembassy-china.org.cn).
Trading and distribution are two separate issues and are, accordingly, covered separately by the WTO implementation documents. Trading simply covers the rights to import and export product into and from China. Distribution, on the other hand, covers the sale/resale of products once the products are in China.
Trading Companies
One of the legal changes as a result of WTO was the release in July of 2001 of the Expanding Import and Export Management Rights of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) rule. Prior to WTO accession, FIEs always had the rights to import materials needed for production and export the products they produced. The rule was designed to allow manufacturing FIEs to become export trading companies, purchasing and exporting any products free from quotas, license control and government monopoly. This is the first step towards implementing China’s commitment to liberalize trading rights. FIEs in foreign trade zones are now allowed to establish offices outside the zones, which will enable FIEs to establish distribution networks across the country before the phase-in of the distribution rights. China’s WTO implementing documents state that 3 years after China’s WTO accession, all Chinese companies that have RMB 1 million in capitalization and are registered, can obtain an import/export license.
The law was to cover the establishment of FIE service suppliers (distribution companies) on December 11, 2002, but then only through joint ventures in which an FIE has a minority stake. However, this did not happen. The Chinese government maintains that as FIEs can set up wholesaling and retailing companies that they meet their requirements. It is unclear at this time whether FIEs will be able to distribute products they do not manufacture in China or whether the foreign invested would need to establish a minority foreign-owned distributor.
Distribution
As we continue to wait for distribution rights to become more liberalized as per the WTO implementation documents, business remains in a similar state. Distribution covers:
Commission agent services,
Wholesale services, and
Retailing.
Regarding FIEs, the WTO implementation documents state that FIES can distribute products they produce/manufacture as well as related subordinate services.
Given the complexities of the markets in China it is advised that foreign companies use a domestic Chinese agent for both importing into China and marketing within China.
With careful selection, training, and constant contact, a U.S. exporter can obtain good market representation from a Chinese trading company, many of which are authorized to deal in a wide range of products. Some of the larger companies have offices in the U.S. and other countries around the world, as well as a network of offices and affiliates in China. However, given transportation and communication difficulties as well as regional peculiarities, most of these trading companies cannot provide diversified coverage throughout China. China’s WTO accession promises a three-year phase in of improved trading rights that should improve such conditions for foreign firms.
Local Agents
In addition to trading companies, China is witnessing an explosion in local sales agents who handle internal distribution and marketing. Most of these firms do not have import/export authorization. They are the next layer down the distribution chain, buying imported products from those entities that have an import/export license. They may be representative offices of Hong Kong or other foreign trading companies, or domestic Chinese firms with regional or partial national networks.
Given China’s size and diversity, as well as the lack of agents with wide-reaching capabilities, it makes sense to engage several agents to cover different areas, and to be cautious when giving exclusive territories. China can be divided roughly into at least five major regions: the South (Guangzhou), the East (Shanghai), the Central/North (Beijing-Tianjin), West China and the Northeast.
The U.S. Commercial Service (USCS) assists new-to-market firms. The International Partner Search (IPS) will locate, screen, and assess potential qualified overseas sales representatives, agents, distributors, joint venture partners, licensees, franchisees or strategic partners for your products or services. The IPS program locates up to six potential agents or distributors, screened from a large pool of candidate firms. Normal turnaround time is around 30 calendar days after each post receives USD 450 for each product line and the company’s product literature. A report is developed from on-the-spot research by U.S. Embassy staff and provides the contacts needed to launch marketing efforts in China. As a next step, a visit to China can be supported by our Gold Key Service (GKS), which is designed to set-up appointments with prospective agents and distributors, and key government officials responsible for an industry (USD 600 per location). IPS clients can upgrade their existing IPS to meet one-on-one with those identified companies (i.e, GKS) for USD 150 if done within 6 months upon completion of the IPS. Regional IPSs and GKSs are available from the USCS offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Chengdu, but nation-wide searches are not available.
For those firms unable to travel and seeking potential partners, USCS continues to offer BuyUSA.com as a user-supported “B2B” Web site. Companies seeking foreign partners may list their firm’s information, and foreign buyers are enlisted worldwide
Establishing a Presence in China
Representative offices are the easiest type of offices for foreign firms to set up in china, but these offices are limited by Chinese law to performing “liaison” activities. As such, they cannot sign sales contracts or directly bill customers or supply parts and after-sales services for a fee, although most representative offices perform these activities in the name of their parent companies. Despite limitations on its scope of business activities, this form of business has proved very successful for many U.S. companies as it allows the business to remain foreign-controlled
China’s Company Law, which has been in effect since July 1, 1994, permits the opening of branches by foreign companies but, as a policy matter, China still restricts this entry approach to selected banks, insurance companies, accounting and law firms. While representative offices are given a registration certificate, branch offices obtain an actual operating or business license and can engage in profit-making activities.
Establishing a representative office gives a company increased control over a dedicated sales force and permits greater utilization of its specialized technical expertise. The cost of supporting a modest representative office ranges from USD 250,000 to USD 500,000 per year, depending on its size and how it is staffed. The largest expenses are rent for office space and housing, expatriate salaries and benefits.
Establishing a Chinese Subsidiary
A locally-incorporated equity or cooperative joint venture with one or more Chinese partners, or a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE, often pronounced “woofy”), may be the final step in developing markets for a company’s products. In-country production avoids import restrictions - including relatively high tariffs - and provides U.S. firms with greater control over both intellectual property and marketing. The establishment of a WFOE in China has gained in popularity among U.S. firms as a result of an easing of restrictions, directly attributed to China’s accession to the WTO.
The role of the Chinese partner in the success or failure of a joint venture cannot be over-emphasized. A good Chinese partner will have the connections to help smooth over red tape and obstructive bureaucrats; a bad partner, on the other hand, can make even the most promising venture fail. Common investor complaints concern conflicts of interest (e.g., the partner setting up competing businesses), bureaucracy and violations of confidentiality). The protection of intellectual property, no matter the form of cooperation, is one of the most pressing matters for U.S. firms doing business in China. American companies should bear in mind that joint ventures are time-consuming and resource demanding, and will involve constant and prudent monitoring of critical areas such as finance, personnel and basic operations in order for them to be a success.
Licensing
Technology transfer is another initial market entry approach used by many companies. It offers short-term profits but runs the risk of creating long-term competitors. Due to this concern, as well as intellectual property considerations and the lower technical level prevailing in the China market, some firms attempt to license older technology, promising higher-level access at some future date or in the context of a future joint venture arrangement.
Licensing contracts must be approved by and registered with the Ministry of Commerce (formally, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)). A tax of 10-20 percent (depending on the technology involved and the existing applicable bilateral tax treaty) is withheld on royalty payments.
Franchising
Many foreign companies are beginning to establish multiple retail outlets under a variety of creative arrangements, including some which for all practical purposes function like franchises. Virtually all of the foreign companies who operate multiple-outlet retail venues in China either manage the retail operations themselves with Chinese partners (typically establishing a different partner in each major city) or sell to a master franchisee, which then leases out and oversees several franchise areas within the territory. Within three years of WTO accession, restrictions on equity share, number of outlets and geographical area are to be eliminated.
Direct Selling
Major U.S. direct selling companies entered the China market in the early- to mid-1990’s, when China’s legal and regulatory framework for this industry was not very clear. Direct selling was quickly modeled after by domestic Chinese companies, some of whom abused this legitimate format of doing business and operated scams to cheat consumers and evade taxes. In early 1998, the Chinese Government started implementing a series of strict controls over this industry, culminating in the re-licensing of all direct selling companies. Although a few major U.S direct selling companies were re-issued business licenses, restrictions are severe and requirements many, resulting in difficult a business environment.
E-Commerce
The Chinese Government has adopted an open attitude towards the advent of electronic commerce in China. Interest among both Chinese and international businesses focuses on investing and on establishing vertical integration and sales channels on-line. Investment is risky, however, due to the lack of clearly defined regulatory powers over the industry, an effective Chinese certificate authentication system, secure and reliable on-line settlement system, and an efficient physical delivery system. Many U.S. IT sector companies have been actively engaged in jointly developing these systems in China, and WTO accession will increase the speed of these developments. E-commerce in China has great potential, but first must overcome three major impediments:
China is still a cash-based society and use of credit cards is not widely adopted;
Channels of distribution in China are not well developed for the delivery of items purchased over the Internet;
Internet security.
There are several Chinese Internet companies that have been very successful in a cash-on-delivery e-commerce model in the major cities. The recent SARS epidemic proved that China is ready to adopt greater e-commerce technology.
Selling Strategies
Relationships
Personal relationships (“guanxi” in Chinese) in business are critical. The Chinese feel more comfortable dealing with “old friends,” and it is important for exporters, importers, and investors to establish and maintain close relationships with their Chinese counterparts and relevant government agencies. It is equally important that American exporters encourage strong personal relationships between their Chinese agents or distributors and the buyers and end-users. A Web of strong personal relationships will help ensure smoother development of business in China.
Foreign Currency
In general, Chinese companies are not permitted to retain foreign exchange. In business deals with Chinese companies, U.S. companies have been asked to keep a portion of the Chinese companies’ hard currency earnings in foreign bank accounts to avoid reporting and turning it over to the foreign exchange control authorities. As part of an effort to clamp down on corruption and tighten foreign exchange control, the Chinese Government is coming down hard on such practices. In September 1997, China issued a new rule allowing some Chinese enterprises that meet a certain criteria to establish a foreign currency account in a designated bank, thus retaining a limited amount of foreign currency earnings. In November 2001, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange adjusted the administration policy of Chinese enterprises’ foreign currency accounts and further lowered the criteria for establishing such foreign currency accounts.
In contrast, FIEs are permitted to retain foreign exchange contributed to or earned by the enterprise. On December 1, 1996, China made its currency convertible on the current trade account. However, foreign exchange balancing requirements remain in effect in other Chinese laws and regulations and in joint venture contractual arrangements.
Chinese companies are, however, able to purchase the foreign currency necessary for authorized imports and foreign currency obligations such as licensing fees, royalties, and loans by authorized entities.
The banking sector is one area that has benefited from WTO accession. The Ministry of Finance has moved very quickly to implement its WTO commitments. Client restriction on foreign banks’ foreign currency services was one of the areas immediately removed upon China’s WTO accession, which meant foreign banks could offer foreign currency services to corporate and individual clients. On March 19, 2002, Citibank announced that it had become the first bank to receive a license to provide foreign currency services to local domestic customers.
Advertising and Trade Promotion
Advertising
Advertising is an effective way to create product awareness among potential consumers in China. Channels for mass advertising include publications, radio, television, billboard displays, Internet, and sports sponsorship.
China’s retail boom and increasing competition among retailers is making China’s advertising industry grow even faster than the economy as a whole. According to China’s National Advertising Association (under the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, or SAIC), over-all advertising spending reached USD 10.92 billion in 2002, a 13.6 percent growth over 2001’s volume. China has about 89,552 advertising businesses, including more than 385 foreign joint ventures. Foreign service suppliers are permitted to establish advertising enterprises in China only in the form of joint ventures with foreign investment no more than 49 percent. Within two years after China’s accession to the WTO, foreign majority ownership will be permitted and within four years after China’s accession, wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries will be permitted. All of the major international advertising firms are present in China.
Television advertising takes up the largest single portion of the Chinese advertising market. China’s regular television viewing population is 84 percent of China’s 1.3 billion people. Major articles sold on television include toiletries, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, liquor, and home electronics. Television stations in big markets (Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai) require advertisers to book and pay for specific spots two to ten months in advance.
Now that China is in the midst of a consumer revolution, foreign products, complete with advanced marketing, advertising and research techniques, are leading the way. Brand awareness is increasingly important and sophisticated advertising is beginning to play a crucial role in charming the Chinese consumer. Foreign products are expected to continue making inroads despite 1999 regulations calling for more control over customer surveys that help foreign firms enhance their marketing effectiveness.
China’s 1995 Advertising Law contains guiding principles that set broad requirements. For example, one of the requirements is that advertising should “safeguard the dignity and interests of the State.” Comparison advertising is not allowed, nor is the use of superlatives. Chinese restrictions within the advertising sector include requirements for the verification of safety and hygiene from the relevant ministries that monitor various consumer products. Censorship standards vary considerably throughout China.
SAIC is the primary regulatory organization for the advertising sector, but many other organizations, such as the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, play an active role in controlling print or television content.
Trade Shows and Missions
Hundreds of exhibitions are now held annually in China. Most are sponsored or co-sponsored by government agencies, professional societies, or the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). Shows are also organized by U.S., Hong Kong and state trade departments, and other professional show organizers. Show participation costs are sometimes high and may only reach a local audience, so companies are advised to scrutinize shows.
Electronic Commerce and the Internet
As growth in Internet usage rises in China, so to does interest in e-commerce activities. Though China remains a developing country, the ambitious use of high technology has made inroads with the growth of governmental and business-to-business forms of e-commerce. Government at all levels seeks to use technology to inform the public about laws, deal with customs and simplify procedures; and businesses are beginning to conduct bidding, process sales and handle contacts on-line. In addition, direct marketing and sales-on-line have begun despite the lack of credit card usage and distribution difficulties. Beijing and Shanghai AICs have begun a licensing process to create a “reasonable and reliable market.” In May 2000, nearly 30 Internet companies were awarded licenses to sell online advertising.
Pricing Issues
Most Chinese consumers are sensitive to price and will usually choose the less expensive product unless they can be swayed by better after-sales service or clearly better product quality. For larger purchases, attractive financing that lowers the effective price is offered by Japanese, European and other foreign governments’ companies, and may make some U.S. products less competitive.
Foreign companies are normally not permitted to directly provide after-sales service and customer support for their products sold into China. FIEs can provide such services for products that they manufacture in-country. Foreign firms sometimes engage authorized Chinese entities to provide service, often on a contractual basis, or to establish service centers jointly that can provide both spare parts and after-sales service. American companies complain that such arrangements give them inadequate control over the quality of customer service and result in the loss of customer confidence. Some companies opt to provide regular servicing from bases outside of China, such as Hong Kong.
Selling to the Government
In 1999, the Chinese State Develop
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