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Executive Report on Strategies in South Korea
ICON Group International, June 2007, Pages: 394
How to Strategically Evaluate South Korea
Perhaps the most efficient way of evaluating South Korea is to consider key dimensions which themselves are composites of multiple factors. Composite portfolio approaches have long been used by strategic planners. The biggest challenge in this approach is to choose the appropriate factors that are the most relevant to international planning. The two measures of greatest relevance are “latent demand” and “market accessibility”. The figure below summarizes the key dimensions and recommendations of such an approach. Using these two composites, one can prioritize all countries of the world. Countries of high latent demand and high relative accessibility (e.g. easier entry for one firm compared to other firms) are given highest priority. The figure below shows two different scenarios. Accessibility is defined as a firm’s ease of entering or supplying from or to a market (the “supply side”), and latent demand is an indicator of the potential in serving from or to the market (the “demand side”).
Framework for Prioritizing Countries
Demand/Market Potential Driven Firm
Relative Accessibility
Accessibility/Supply Averse Firm
Relative Accessibility
In the top figure, the firm is driven by market potential, whereas the bottom figure represents a firm that is driven by costs or by an aversion to difficult markets. This report treats the reader as coming from a “generic firm” approaching the global market - neither a market-driven nor a cost-driven company. Planners must therefore augment this report with their own company-specific factors that might change the priorities.
Latent Demand and Accessibility in South Korea
This report provides an extremely detailed overview of factors driving latent demand and accessibility in South Korea. Latent demand is largely driven by economic fundamentals. But, latent demand only represents half of the picture. A country may at first sight appear to be attractive due to a high latent demand, but it is often less attractive when one considers at the macro level how easy it might be to serve that entire potential and/or general business risks.
Chapter 2 deals with macro-accessibility. While accessibility will always vary from one company to another for a given country, the following domains are typically considered when evaluating macro-accessibility in South Korea:
Openness to Trade in South Korea
Openness to Direct Investment in South Korea
Local Marketing and Entry Strategy Alternatives
Local Human Resources
Local Risks
Across these domains, a number of not-so-obvious factors can affect accessibility and risk. These are also covered in Chapter 2, which is presented from the perspective of an American firm, though it is equally applicable to most firms entering South Korea. This chapter has been authored by local offices of the U.S. Government. I have included a number of edits to clarify the provided information as it relates to the general strategic framework.
In Chapter 3, I summarize the economic potential for South Korea over the next five years for hundreds of industries, categories, and products. The goal of this chapter is to report my findings on the real economic potential, or latent demand, represented by South Korea when defined as an area of dominant influence. The data presented are the result of various spatial econometric and time-series forecasting models which, for each category presented, are applied to forecast and allocate latent demand across all countries of the world and major distribution centers or centers of dominant influence within each country. This is accomplished knowing that economic fundamentals (e.g. income) generally vary from one country to another within a given country over time. In this chapter, I report the allocation for each category for South Korea as an area of dominant influence in Asia and, potentially, the world.
The report concludes with trade indicators for South Korea. Often, the amount of trade flowing into and out of a country is a strong indicator of trading partners, trade openness, and related latent demand. Trade indicators are purely statistical in nature. Although international trade is not a direct measure of latent demand, it does provide an indicator of general market conditions with respect to trade flows and trade openness in South Korea.
As a whole, this report presents a strategic assessment of South Korea by considering an extremely broad set of factors affecting both latent demand and accessibility, as outlined in the following chapters.
MACRO-ACCESSIBILITY IN SOUTH KOREA
Economic Fundamentals and Dynamics
Continued high indebtedness among Korean companies and weak profit performance, often exacerbated by chronic over-capacity and over-staffing (partly due to Koreas inflexible labor laws), remain important problems. Many analysts have commented that, at any given time, 25-30% of Korean firms are unable to meet their interest payments from operating profits, rendering them technically bankrupt.
On the bright side, as the attractions of lending to large Korean corporates diminishes, small and medium sized enterprises are enjoying lower rates and better terms and access to loans due to increased competition in the banking sector. Also, corporate debt has increased only slightly since the 1997 economic crisis, while corporate debt-GDP ratios have decreased. Questions remain over how many more stricken companies have yet to emerge and whether corporations can soon increase profitability given the current economic slowdown.
Wide-ranging reforms undertaken during President Kims administration have accelerated the evolution of Koreas financial and corporate sectors away from the previous state-led economic model toward a more free-market model, but the Korean governments continued direct or indirect involvement in the economy, particularly its continued ownership of most of Koreas commercial banks, often has conflicted with its goal of pushing toward a market economy.
Korea is possibly the worlds most 'wired' economy. Certainly it is difficult to think of another society where Internet or cell phone usage is higher than in Korea. The demand for wireless technology components continues to rise. These developments have opened up opportunities to a variety of new markets that focus on information communication services via the Internet and wireless content platforms.
Government Intervention Risks
The Korean government traditionally has pursued conservative macroeconomic policies. Government spending and taxes as a share of GDP are comparatively low by international standards, averaging about 21%-22% over the last few years. For several years before the 1997-98 financial crisis, the central government budget was virtually in balance. Moreover, the quality of public expenditure is high, with an emphasis on education and public works rather than on transfer payments. In 1998, with the support and encouragement of the IMF and World Bank, government spending rose 13.1% to stimulate the economy, raising its GDP share to 24.5%, with a fiscal deficit of about 5% of GDP.
At the microeconomic level, past government intervention has been extensive and costly in terms of economic efficiency. Financial capital was and continues to be expensive, due in part to large non-performing loan portfolios saddled on banks during the highly interventionist 1970-1989 period, to government credit controls (with credit allocated largely by firm size) and to the overall lack of competition and rigidities in the financial system. Overseas capital transactions were tightly controlled. Investment and product safety regulations inhibited domestic competition across all sectors and often discriminated against foreign products, to the detriment of Korean consumers.
Under the terms of the 1998 IMF agreement, Korea largely opened its financial and corporate sectors to foreign investment, and reduced or removed controls on overseas capital transactions. During the 1997-98 financial crisis, the government was forced to acquire the majority of Koreas commercial banks, which faced insolvency. Even though the government has always declared its intention of reversing its nationalization of the banking sector, it has yet to publish an actual time schedule for selling the banks to private investors, saying that market conditions are not yet right. The governments continued ownership of much of the banking sector has produced a continual conflict of interest between its role as economic regulator and its interest in protecting government investments.
The Korean government also owns a total of 26 non-financial public enterprises. The government has begun to privatize and sell off many of these enterprises to raise funds and to reduce the governments economic role. Although details remain to be worked out, the government has announced it will allow private and foreign investors to buy a varying proportion of shares (up to 100% in some cases) of these companies.
Infrastructure Development
Koreas transportation network is in need of expansion. Though it already possesses an extensive highway system with several major North-South and East-West highway arteries, the countrys exploding vehicular traffic continues to strain the countrys transport network. As a result, Koreas transport authorities have launched a multi-billion dollar expansion of the nations highways. Municipal authorities also are expanding Seouls already extensive subway system. Also, trains and buses travel regularly to the far reaches of the country. In addition, Korea has several international and many domestic airports in the largest cities, Incheon International Airport, Busan International Airport, Cheongju International Airport, and the international airport on Cheju island. The country is moving to expand airports, including Incheon International Airport, that are currently incapable of handling ever-growing air traffic. Koreas port managers also are planning billions of dollars in major projects, as they race to catch-up with the countrys sharp economic growth and jump in trade activity, which continues to strain existing facilities.
Political Risks
Economic Relationship with the United States
South Korean democracy has become firmly established since 1987. The United States has a strong security relationship with the Republic of Korea and is committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The United States is obligated under the 1953 U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty to help Korea defend itself from external aggression. The United States maintains about 37,000 uniformed personnel in the country, commanded by a U.S. four-star general who is also commander of the United Nations Command. U.S. forces include the U.S. Second Infantry Division (2ID) and air force squadrons.
Politics and the Business Climate
Relations between the two Koreas affect the business climate. After the North-South Korean summit was held in June 2000, the range and frequency of inter-Korean contacts increased dramatically for a time. Ten cabinet-level meetings, including a Defense Ministerial, were held. Six reunions of families separated since the Korean War have been held, briefly reuniting several thousand members of divided families. However, key economic projects and agreements have not been fully implemented, including re-linking the main rail line between South and North, establishing a Special Economic Zone at Kaesong in the DPRK, and opening a land route for southern tourists to the scenic tourist zone of Mt. Kumgang in the North. Presently, there is limited official contact between the two governments, but private exchanges continue. North Korea continues to maintain and develop its massive military force.
The Politic System
Korea is governed by a directly-elected President and a unicameral National Assembly selected through direct elections. The president serves a single five-year term. National Assembly legislators are elected every four years.
Marketing Strategies
Distribution Channel Options
Local representation is essential for the success of foreign firms in the Korean market. This is especially true when considering the fact that in Korea, business relationships are built upon personal ties and social introductions, and that much of the major third-country competition is only a few flight-hours away. In addition, for sectors that involve any type of government procurement, an entity must be registered with the Korean government in order to bid on the procurement projects. Hence, many American firms enter into a consortium with a Korean company or enter into a representative agreement, especially for the purposes of market entry. Finally, the language barrier and established social/ business circles make it extremely difficult to enter the Korean market without a qualified Korean representative.
Distribution methods and the number and functions of intermediaries vary widely by product area and local conditions. The market for most consumer products is concentrated in major cities. Retail distribution is accomplished through a highly complex network, the majority of which are small family-run stores, stalls in markets, and street vendors, though this traditional distribution method is changing rapidly toward large-sized discount stores. There are many large retail stores in the major cities, especially Seoul, Daegu, Busan, and their outer-lying suburbs. This distribution channel is one of the best ways to market foreign products to Korean consumers. Recently, retailing concepts such as Full-Line Discount Stores (FDS) including Price Costco (USA), Wal-Mart (USA), Carrefour (France), and E-mart (Korea) have gained tremendous popularity in Korea. Rapid expansion of these discount chain stores is planned nationwide, with suburban satellite cities attracting the greatest number of stores.
In November 1995, regulations from the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) went into effect, which allowed the legal entry of parallel imports. Prior to this legislation, distribution was disciplined with exclusive distributor/agents agreements. Besides an authorized and registered distributor/agent, no other importer could legally clear goods through Korean customs. As a result, importers that were not the exclusive distributor/agent found their shipments frequently held up at customs.
The effect of parallel imports is to marginally reduce the value of an exclusive distribution agreement. Many American companies continue to give exclusives, since they have in place territorial limits in neighboring countries that enhance the value of the exclusive in any one country. Likewise, any parallel importer in Korea that is not receiving the support of the OEM, and does not deal in the same volume, cannot be guaranteed a steady source of supply. As noted above, the legitimate exclusive distributor still has considerable advantages in Korea.
Pricing Issues
The rate of commission for using an agent or distributor varies depending on the type of product and the transaction amount. On average, Korean agents require a 10% commission, particularly when a transaction is conducted on a spot basis, but this varies for different products. Generally, a 5-7% commission applies to product categories such as general machinery including packaging, construction, and material handling equipment. Meanwhile, more sophisticated products such as medical, laboratory, and scientific analytical instruments usually require a commission of 15-18% or more, since these are products for which after-sales service is considered to be very important.
On August 1, 2000, the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE) passed consumer-protection legislation requiring that consumer items be labeled with both the manufacturers sales price to the retailer and the marked-up retailers price to the consumer. The mark-up from manufacturer to consumer ranges from 50% to 150%.
Agents and Distributors
The most common means of representation include:
Appointing a registered commissioned agent (more commonly known as an 'offer agent' in Korea) on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis
Naming a registered trading company as an agent
Establishing a branch sales office managed by home office personnel with Korean staff
Any traders registered with the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) can import goods in their own names. Appointing a registered trading company (rather than an 'offer agent') as an agent has its advantages because these agents can handle all of the importing paperwork and imports for their own account. Registered trading companies tend to be larger firms and they split their businesses between exports and imports. However, these larger firms may be less attentive to building the U.S. suppliers business, placing a higher emphasis on diversifying their portfolio of products from different countries. Similarly, while the larger general trading companies may be influential and well known in the market, they also may not devote as much attention to a single product as smaller firms do.
To find a local representative, a good place to begin with is a fee-based service called the International Partner Search (IPS) through the U.S. Export Assistance Centers (USEAC) located throughout the U.S. and Commercial Service Korea (CS Korea). For a modest fee, CS Koreas industry specialists will tap into their well-established network of industry contacts and trade associations. The client will soon receive an annotated list of three to five potential, qualified representatives. The next step would be to plan a visit to Korea, perhaps calling upon CS Korea to arrange market briefings, a meeting schedule, and an interpreter/secretary under another fee-based service called the Korea Gold Key (KGK).
Another good contact is the Korea Importers Association (KOIMA), a well-established, private trade association founded under government auspices dedicated to increasing imports into Korea. To fulfill its original mission of promoting balanced trade, KOIMA helps execute Koreas import diversification plan, leads annual purchasing missions to the United States, Latin America, and Europe, and holds monthly meetings between member agents and the commercial sections of various embassies located in Korea.
In the past, Korean law stipulated that a sales agent must be a member of KOIMA to issue and make price quotations, or make pro forma invoices in their own names. However, since the beginning of January 2000, this once mandatory registration requirement is now voluntary. Quotations, locally used as offers, issued directly by foreign suppliers are no longer subject to case-by-case approval by KOIMA. A commissioned agent/distributor does not have to be registered with KOIMA. American businesses can contact KOIMA by sending their company catalogs with a letter specifying the items for which they are seeking an agent or visit the KOIMA office directly. Catalogs are displayed in the KOIMA library and inquiries are published free of charge on the associations web site or in the monthly KOIMA Magazine. The U.S. Commercial Service of the U.S. Embassy also works closely with KOIMA to advertise requests for agents received from American companies.
Generally speaking, an agency contract includes an outline on the termination of the contract. When there are no specific provisions in a contract on agent termination, the Korean Commercial Arbitration Code can specify the provisions for terminating an agent contract. This compensation clause allows the agent to claim compensation from the principal. The amount of compensation is usually determined as the total year average of one years sales commission (i.e. total sales commission over the years divided by the number of years). As a mutually signed contract between supplier and agent/distributor overrules the default Korean provisions of claims for a commercial agent, U.S. companies are advised to include provisions on agent termination.
The U.S. Commercial Service in Korea recommends that U.S. companies seek legal counsel prior to signing a contract in Korea. The legal advice that a law firm with international experience provides is very important. Most experts recommend hiring a local attorney prior to making major business decisions in dealing with Korean companies.
U.S. companies should also seek legal counsel with regards to protecting their intellectual property. Trademark and patent registration (if applicable) with the Korea Industrial Property Office (KIPO) is the minimum safeguard for your intellectual property rights in Korea. U.S. companies are advised to seek the services of a local attorney to directly register their trademarks and/or patents in their own names, not the Korean agents name. In order to have control over these important intellectual property rights, registration must be done in the U.S. companys name. Korean law requires that only local attorneys be allowed to fill out and submit applications to KIPO.
Useful Contacts
Association of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea
AFTAK Bldg., 218 Hankangro 2-ka
Yongsan-ku, Seoul 140-012, Korea
TEL: 82-2-792-1581/4
FAX: 82-2-785-4373
Web site: www.aftak.or.kr
The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB)
43rd Floor, Trade Tower 159 Samsung-dong
Kangnam-ku, Seoul 135-729 Korea
Trade Center P.O.Box 50
TEL: 82-2-551-2000/19
FAX: 82-2-551-2020
Web site: www.kcab.or.kr
Branch Office, Pusan Korea (KCAB)
Rm. 805, Daehan Tongun Bldg.
1211-1, Choryang-dong
Dong-ku, Pusan 601-714 Korea
TEL: 82-51- 441-7036/8
FAX: 82-51-441-7039
Web site: www.kcab.or.kr
Korea International Trade Association (KITA)
6th floor, Trade Tower, KWTC
159-1, Samsung-dong, Kangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea
Tel: 82-2-6000-5267
Fax: 82-2-6000-5161
E-Mail: trio@kotis.net
Web site: www.kita.or.kr
Direct Selling Options
Door-to-Door Sales
The major door-to- door sales items include home education materials, books, household consumer goods, cosmetics, health foods, sporting goods, and service products, such as insurance and travel counseling.
Multi-Level Marketing
Over the years, the Korean government has derided MLM as an 'undesirable or inappropriate business form' for Korea, claiming that it neglects consumer safety, profits 'excessively,' and threatens the Korean social fabric through its 'pyramid schemes.' However, MLMs negative image in Korea appears to be changing due to the combined efforts of U.S. firms, Commercial Service Korea, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), AmCham Korea, and the Korea Direct Selling Association (KDSA), whose membership includes almost all U.S. MLM companies doing business in Korea. KDSA also is a member of the World Federation of Direct Selling Associations in Washington, D.C.
In keeping with its deregulation plan, the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) reduced the restrictions on MLM companies by amending its original Door-to-Door Sales Act (DDSA), which the Korean National Assembly passed on January 5, 1999. The new legislation eliminated most existing market barriers against MLM industrys products, such as the obligation to disclose retail prices on the MLM product label. In addition, on May 25, 1999, the authority to enforce this new legislation was transferred from MOCIE to the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) by the newly revised Government Reorganization Law.
The DDSA contains some restrictive provisions that the MLM industry is working on modifying in order to further protect Korean consumers. For example, the new DDSA requires all MLM companies take out a consumer protection and compensation insurance policy. The insurance is to protect distributors and consumers in the event MLM companies go out of business. Currently, in the case of misfortune, a distributor is to receive a 70% refund of the price of goods, whereas a consumer is to receive 90% of the price of goods.
As a result of these market liberalization measures, multi-level marketing activities by U.S. firms in the cosmetics, cleaning products, and kitchenware sectors have been expanding. In order to garner further successes, however, U.S. multi-level sales firms should promote their products and services appropriately and efficiently by carefully analyzing Korean market trends. Prior knowledge of the market conditions can help prevent unnecessary conflicts with government officials, consumer `watchdog groups, or industry groups.
Direct Marketing Options
The Korea E-Commerce & Direct Marketing Association (KEDMA) estimates that by December 2002, there were approximately 33,000 direct marketing firms in Korea. Gross revenues for the Korean direct marketing industry in 2002, including catalog sales and TV and Internet shopping, are as follows:
Catalog sales: USD 705 million
TV home shopping: USD 3,070 million
Internet shopping: USD 2,113 million
Total: USD 5,888 million
Joint Ventures/Licensing
Since the late 1997 economic crisis, the Korean government has made a dramatic and high-profile effort to attract foreign investment for the purposes of restructuring the Korean economy and bringing in much needed foreign capital. In its efforts to counter the economic downturn, the government has not only publicly encouraged foreign investment, but it has also implemented liberalization policy measures, including an increase in foreign equity ownership, in order to accommodate its goals. Though a group of high-level officials headed by President Roh and the Prime Ministers Office have spearheaded efforts to de-regulate and liberalize the economy, some foreign companies have responded negatively to the initiatives, with claims that the policies block restrictive regulations that would eliminate trade and investment barriers at the working level.
Nevertheless, many foreign companies that already have operations in Korea chose this opportunity to increase their involvement in Korea, such as Coca-Cola and Pfizer. Meanwhile, other U.S. investors continue to be cautious because of continued concerns over corporate transparency and indebtedness. Opportunities exist for such prudent investors though it may be some time before many investors regain former levels of confidence.
Foreign investment approval is controlled by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) and governed by the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) of 1998. The FIPA is expected to enhance investor rights and incentives as well as remove bureaucratic obstacles to investment.
Selecting the appropriate partner is one of the most difficult and crucial aspects of initiating a joint venture in Korea. The large Korean conglomerates 'chaebols' still exercise considerable influence in Korea, permeating throughout the countrys government and financial institutions. On the other hand, the Korean governments attempts at a policy shift toward the support of small and medium-sized businesses mean that the participation of a 'chaebol' in a joint venture could create additional obstacles in terms of obtaining necessary approvals and local financing. This is further compounded because of the recent government policy shift towards anti-monopoly behavior. In addition, 'chaebols' tend to insist on operating a joint venture in accordance with the overall policies and business culture of the group, sometimes to the detriment of the foreign shareholders interest. Though an injection of foreign capital may be deemed necessary for the survival of a company, there is a tendency inherent in Korean business culture to maintain local control, regardless of the percentage invested by foreign entities. A U.S. company may therefore consider assigning its headquarters staff to Korea in order to closely monitor and influence the activities of a newly established joint venture company.
Management control must be evaluated on three levels:
Shareholder equity
Representation on the board of directors
Active management (representative director and subordinate management)
Legally, Korean board meetings require the physical presence of all members as well as a quorum of the directors. Therefore, if a foreign investor intends to exercise day-to-day management, he/she must appoint a representative director who resides in Korea. Moreover, the representative director will need the support of and access to key functional areas of the company in order to manage in accordance with the foreign investors wishes. Therefore, the internal organization of a joint venture company as well as key management appointments should be worked out and agreed upon by all involved parties as early as possible.
The compatibility of goals between the Korean and foreign partners is also crucial to the joint ventures success. Problems may arise due to conflicting goals. For example, the foreign investors primary goal may be to send profit dividends offshore while his/her Korean counterpart may be most concerned with corporate growth in Korea, particularly through exporting to overseas markets.
To most Koreans, a contract represents the current understanding of a 'deal' and is the beginning of rather than an end to negotiations with a Korean partner. If changing circumstances result in omissions or points that no longer accurately reflect the original agreement, then problems will arise. The same is true if the contracting parties change. This type of experiences in Korea has led many foreigners to believe that Koreans place less importance on a written contract than Westerners. Though Americans may regard a written contract as legally binding, Koreans may regard the same contract as a 'gentlemens agreement' that is subject to further negotiations should conditions change. Therefore, contract negotiations with Koreans should be viewed as a process of extensive dialogue and as having the following objectives:
Reaching a common understanding of the deal that includes each partys responsibilities
Recording that detailed understanding
Being prepared to modify the terms of the agreement should there be a change in circumstances.
Certain terms of the commercial relationship between the joint venture partners, such as technology transfer, raw material supply, marketing and distribution, should be agreed upon in detail in the joint venture agreement. Though circumstances are slowly changing, Korean companies have not invested a great portion of their operating funds towards research and development. For this reason, there is a large Korean demand for technology transfer licensing agreements from foreign countries, particularly the United States, whose companies have a comparative advantage in the high technology area.
American companies should proceed with caution when they enter into a transfer technology licensing agreement. A companys intellectual property is not necessarily protected and may be particularly vulnerable in the later stages of a business relationship when the survival of a Korean company is dependent on the technology. Though U.S. companies oftentimes register their patented technology with the Korean Industrial Property Office (KIPO) before entering into a licensing agreement, the most successful American companies intentionally withhold a small but key component of the manufacturing process or component from their Korean partner. This preventative strategy allows the U.S. company to control the use of the licensed technology as well as maintain the integrity of the licensing agreement.
If a contract is violated in Korea, the countrys legal procedures can be lengthy, cumbersome and expensive. Hence, if at all possible, the best strategy to employ is to prevent all possible conflicts. The identification of a viable and trustworthy business partner from the outset is essential; therefore, foreign investors should exercise due diligence when selecting a business partner.
One precautionary approach is to consult with attorneys throughout negotiations of a contract. In addition to consulting with an attorney, foreign investors should also consult with the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB). The KCAB is staffed with counselors who advise U.S. companies on contract guidelines. At the companys request, an assigned KCAB counselor can review the contract and stress the importance of an arbitration clause in the contract. The KCAB contact information is as follows:
Mr. Lee, Joo-Won, Manager
Public Information Section
The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board
43rd Floor, Trade Tower (Korea World Trade Center)
159 Samsung-dong, Kangnam-ku
Seou
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