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Yemen Defence and Security Report 2011
Business Monitor International, Jan 2011, Pages: 105
The Yeman Defence and Security Report provides industry professionals and strategists, corporate analysts, defence and security associations, government departments and regulatory bodies with independent forecasts and competitive intelligence on Yeman's defence and security industry.
In 2010, the report estimates that Yemen’s defence spending totalled US$1.322bn, or US$54.50 per capita, growing 11.22% from US$1.189bn in 2009. Defence expenditure stayed steady at 4.2% of GDP, one of the highest levels in the world, and grew from 11.6% to 13.2% of government expenditure, a high proportion by most countries’ standards.
In 2011, we expect spending to rise 2.66% to US$1.357bn. Though this will represent a 7% shrinkage in constant price terms, expenditure will increase to 14.5% of government spending.
Over the remainder of the forecast period, to 2019, we expect defence spending to rise relatively rapidly in nominal terms, with annual growth rates generally between 8.0% and 9.5%. By 2019, BMI forecasts that defence expenditure will total US$2.630bn, or US$85.30 per capita. It is indicative of Yemen’s deeply serious security problems that this is likely to account for 25% of government spending, a massive allocation of resources for a country with serious development challenges in almost every other area, including infrastructure, health care and education. Nonetheless, defence outlay is likely to remain at 4.2% of GDP.
The government of Ali Abdullah Saleh is under renewed short-term pressure and the seeming inability of the regime to tackle major social, economic and political pressures could presage a destabilisation of the state over the long term. Though Gulf States will provide a level of political and military support, particularly to stem the Houthi rebellion, this will not be enough to secure a full victory for President Saleh's government. In this context, security will continue to unravel and the government will find it difficult to hold the centre. However, the conditions for a major change in Yemen’s trajectory could yet emerge. These are broadly (a) increased democratisation; (b) revolution (c) a coup; and (d), the country split into two component parts, north and south, as in the pre-1990 period.
Developments in the fourth quarter of 2010 were telling: firstly, it was allegedly revealed that the Yemeni government had indeed encouraged the US to operate against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the country, and secondly, AQAP stepped up attacks on the Houthis. It is clear that the situation is becoming more volatile and unpredictable, and the former revelations may galvanise support behind AQAP to a degree by enraging Yemeni nationalists.
The nature of US military involvement in Yemen is changing. Funding for equipment and training to support Yemeni counter terrorism operations is increasing rapidly, and although US authorities have ruled out any direct military operations in the country, drone attacks have already become commonplace. Furthermore, the channelling of funding through the Department of Defence, rather than the usual State Department channels, indicates the growing influence of the military over US policy in Yemen.
AQAP has been accused of ramping up sectarian tensions in Yemen, staging two large attacks on Houthi rebels, al-Qaeda has allegedly been responsible for attacks on Shiites and Shia monuments in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the prospect of a glut of sectarian violence in Yemen is yet another disturbing feature of the country’s deteriorating security situation.
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