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Legislative Procedures and Lawmaking in Central America. Edition No. 1
VDM Publishing House, Aug 2008, Pages: 204
The book covers issues of constitutional design,
legislative procedures and agenda control four
Central American cases in a comparative perspective.
The results relate to the critical view that
presidential systems are inherently prone to
institutional deadlock, deriving from their rigid
constitutional design. My findings suggest that
constitutional rules only determine broad parameters
of variation, and that greater attention should be
paid to the endogenous procedural design of the
legislative process of decision-making in the
explanation of institutional performance and
inter-branch dynamics.
The work is comparative and bridges quantitative and
qualitative analysis. The data employed are original
of lawmaking in one legislative term for the four
cases under analysis.
A final set of normative reflections includes ideas
on the relevance of understanding constitutional
choice. The theoretical, substantive and
methodological implications of the findings are thus
reinserted into a normative view on procedural
justice and the quality of democracy.
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