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Pricing and Bidding Strategies in Iterative
Combinatorial Auctions. Edition No. 1
VDM Publishing House, Sep 2008, Pages: 240
Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based
economic mechanisms in which bidders submit bundle
bids iteratively and the auctioneer computes
allocations and ask prices in each auction round. In
addition to strategic problems, the design of such
auction formats exhibits hard computational problems.
More recently, researchers have focused on the
pricing and information feedback in ICAs. This book
presents the results of 5 years research in this
field, whereas the emphasis was put on the practical
applicability of considered auction designs and
pricing mechanisms in these auctions. The main topic
of this book is a comprehensive comparison of the
most important auction designs proposed in the
literature by means of computational and laboratory
experiments. Additionally, the book presents a new
auction design ALPS, which has been shown very
efficient and robust in many settings. In laboratory
experiments all considered auction designs were
tested for practical applicability and robustness
against diverse bidding strategies.
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