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Viewing report
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Argentina and Brazil’s Politics of Taxation:. Edition No. 1
VDM Publishing House, Oct 2008, Pages: 300
This book addresses the causes of tax policy changes,
its direction and magnitude, in a comparative way by
studying three dimensions: centralization,
progressivity, and level in Argentina and Brazil
during the 1980s and 1990s. I present a contingent
application of veto players theory to explain changes
in taxation. It gives importance to strategic actors’
interactions and their institutional realities. I put
forth the necessity of a reduction of effective veto
players for change to take place within a realm of
multiple veto players. I argue that due to a
reduction of veto players during the late 1980s in
both cases, change took place in Argentina and
Brazil, but to different extent and nature. The
reason for their divergences is the different nature
of the respective veto players’ reductions and the
prevailing interests after these temporary
reductions. The result of the analysis is that
Argentina and Brazil decreased the progressive
capacity of their taxation, but Argentina decreased
it more than Brazil. I close this book with an
empirical and theoretical puzzle regarding
Argentina’s lower taxation level than Brazil.
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