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Jordan Defence and Security Report 2012
Business Monitor International, Jan 2012, Pages: 106
In 2011 BMI estimates that defence spending fell by 1.12% in Jordanian dinar terms, to JOD1.01bn. This fall is viewed as temporary, however, and in fact only represents a fall to 5.46% of GDP being spent on defence – still a very significant figure comparatively to global terms. BMI sees a growth of around 8.3% in defence spending through 2012, which will increase to 10% in 2015, before dropping slightly to 8.7% in 2016. Constant US$ change, however, is more relaxed, with a return to growth in 2012 of 3.8% following a 6.3% contraction in 2011. This budget is subsidised heavily by much of the rest of the world, with transfers often being labelled as gifts or being recognised as part of a package of aid. In particular, the GCC (particularly Saudi Arabia), as well as the US, have given large grants to the Hashemite kingdom in 2011, and this has had a noticeable effect on the finances of the state.
With Middle East defence spending expected to reach record levels by the end of the forecast period, with overall budgets expected to be US$80.0bn by 2015, as reported by Gulfweb, a news agency, Jordan’s position as the third-largest spender in the region seems likely to be maintained.
However, top-level economic growth is expected to be much slower in the coming year than it has been in the recent past, with an official predicted 3% growth in 2011, stated by Faris Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the former central banker, in October 2011. This is notably slower than the 7% that was experienced through much of the last decade, and as such will have a notable effect on the spending policies of the Kingdom, and even this 3% may now be unlikely. In this case, a series of much more serious belt-tightening may be underway.
Defence spending in Jordan may often, however, represent more than just an acquisition of arms and capabilities – it can also be seen as a way to increase the legitimacy of the regime, as it both creates a more effective deterrent in the relationship with Israel, as well as offering the King the opportunity to give his main support base, the East Bankers, a privileged position in society in relation to the Palestinian population. This has the effect of not necessarily increasing capacity directly in line with investment. While the Jordanian armed forces are seen as some of the more effective in the Middle East Region, there is also the wide-spread perception that they are bloated in terms of personnel, possibly to the point of limiting funds for further procurement in the near future.
Since the tail end of 2010, the advent of the Arab Spring has put many readings of Jordanian politics and regime security into a totally different light – that of the possibility of imminent change based on widespread grassroots political movement. However, there is little to suggest that there will be a replica of Tunisia or Egypt in Jordan – with much firmer American support, as well as a more fragmented society under King Abdullah II than either of the supposed analogues. There is still a widespread taboo concerning talking bad of the King – and while this may be weakening, it certainly seems that there will need to be a serious ‘watershed’ moment for this belief to be realised in any meaningful way. This should in no way become the dominant narrative to any understanding of regime security in Jordan, however.
There is certainly ongoing economic discontent due to high poverty and unemployment, and a growing anti-US stance among the Jordanian public, in opposition to the government’s pro-US policy. These were elements that were obvious in other Arab autocracies in the past two years, and as these revolutions were also largely unexpected, it would be unwise to totally discount any changes in the coming forecast period.
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