Contents:

1. Introduction International Law at Work Methodology Compliance and Effectiveness in International Law The Scope of the Book 2. A General Theory of International Law Games States Play The Three Rs of Compliance International Tribunals and State Responsibility Payoffs and Strategies Over Time Modulating the Level of Commitment Coercion and International Agreements Multilateral Cooperation 3. Reputation How Reputation is Gained and Lost Managing Reputation Over Time The Role of Information The Compartmentalizing of Reputation Limits and Caveats 4. International Agreements Why Do States Make Agreements? Matters of Form The Interaction of Form and Substance The Scope of Agreements Membership in International Agreements Conclusion 5. Customary International Law The Traditional Definition of CIL Rational Choice Critics Compliance and CIL Opinio Juris State Practice An Example of CIL: Pacta Sunt Servanda CIL and Other International Law 6. Understanding International Law Notes Bibliography Index

Reviews

"At last! A comprehensive rational choice account of international law that demonstrates why international law does work rather than why it does not. Andrew Guzman demonstrates remarkable mastery of both the international law and the international relations literature, drawing them together in ways that put theoretical and empirical flesh on the bones of more traditional international lawyers assertions. How International Law Works is an important contribution to an ongoing debate and is bound to inspire further debates of its own." --Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and former President of the American Society of International Law "Guzmans lucid account of international law from a rationalist-institutionalist perspective presents his core concepts of reputation, reciprocity and retaliation in inter-state relations with a clarity that is ideal for students of law and political science, while making excellent use of his expertise in international law and economics to generate research agendas and insights into existing practices and legal doctrines that will enrich specialist international law scholarship even among those who take entirely different approaches to the field." --Benedict Kingsbury, Director, Institute for International Law and Justice NYU Law School "This is a crisply written, theoretically rigorous, and lucid argument about why international treaties, rules of custom, and even soft law are more than forms of cheap talk. Guzman tells us, in the modern language of game theory, why policymakers care when they give their word." --Jose E. Alvarez, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law & Diplomacy Columbia Law School