- Language: English
- 88 Pages
- Published: February 2012
- Region: Israel
Iran Defence and Security Report Q3 2012
- ID: 2135345
- May 2012
- Region: Iran
- 103 Pages
- Business Monitor International
Business Monitor International's Iran Defence and Security Report provides industry professionals and strategists, corporate analysts, defence and security associations, government departments and regulatory bodies with independent forecasts and competitive intelligence on Iran's defence and security industry.
By the end of March 2012 it was still unclear whether the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme would reach a diplomatic or military conclusion. Having just held talks with the US president, Barack Obama, at the Seoul Nuclear Summit, the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tehran in late March for meetings with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His trip was interpreted as preparation for a make-or-break mid- April summit, possibly to be held in Istanbul, involving Iran and the group of countries known as the P5+1: China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US. Erdogan’s intervention was seen as critical because he shares some common ground with those on both sides of the argument, and is therefore someone who could help broker a peaceful solution.
The summit could offer Iran a diplomatic lifeline, as sanctions begin to ramp up pressure on its economy and Israel makes preparations to launch military action to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Iranian oil exports fell in March, and Chinese purchases declined significantly (due to a pricing dispute, rather than any Chinese decision to fall in line with Western sanctions). With EU imports also set to drop off over the next few months as sanctions kick in, Iran faces a very tough economic outlook unless it can reach a deal. However, there was some good news for Iran in late March when the US decided to exempt 10 EU countries and Japan, which had already reduced their imports, from the sanctions.
Parliamentary elections in March appeared to pile more political pressure on Ahmadinejad, whose party failed to win a majority and whose sister suffered defeat in her electoral constituency. However, it was unclear how successful an opposition call for voters to boycott the election had actually proved, with no independent verification of the turnout available. In February Ahmadinejad announced that he was more than doubling the country’s defence budget by ordering a 127% increase, although he did not disclose Tehran’s current level of defence spending.
Iran also unveiled a series of new military systems, which underlined the fact that attacking the country could pose some serious tactical challenges to US or Israeli forces. State TV profiled a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called the Shaparak in March, while defence minister General Ahmad Vahidi announced in February that a new anti-ship cruise missile, the Zafar, had entered series production. Vahidi also said that the Iranian defence industry had successfully developed a new type of guided artillery shell.
However, senior Israeli officials reported that Iran was working on more advanced capabilities. In February, Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon claimed that Iran was developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US, while in the same month the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Aviv Kochavi, said publicly that Iran was now capable of producing a nuclear weapon with a year. Besides these weapons programmes, concern over Iran also centred on the country’s covert activities in what is a highly sensitive region in the context of the Arab Spring. US CENTCOM commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee in early March that Iran was working behind the scenes to bolster the Assad regime in Syria.
However, Iran’s nuclear programme has seen an apparent US-Israeli split emerge that could work in Iran’s favour, with the US government seemingly more reluctant to resort to military action than the Israeli administration of the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. At the end of March, unnamed US officials leaked the revelation that Israel had secured a deal with Azerbaijan that would enable Israeli aircraft to use Azeri airbases to attack Iran. Some media commentators interpreted this as a deliberate US attempt to block Israeli action. Liberal Israeli newspaper Haaretz also reported that Tel Aviv would not now attack Iran in 2012.
However, the intentions of both Tehran and Tel Aviv remain opaque, and as things stand Iran’s security outlook remains extremely severe, with the forthcoming April summit perhaps the last chance for Iran and the international community to find a peaceful resolution.
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Iran Security SWOT
Iran Defence Industry SWOT
Iran Political SWOT
Iran Economic SWOT
Iran Business Environment SWOT
Global Political Outlook
Major Risks Looming In 2012-2013
Global Flashpoints: Eurozone, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Korean Peninsula
Table: Election Timetable, Q212-Q113
Wild Cards To Watch
Middle East Security Overview
The Middle East In A Global Context
Challenges And Threats To Stability And Security
Regional Power Dynamics
Scenarios For The Middle East
Security Risk Ratings
Table: Middle East And Africa Defence And Security Ratings
Table: Middle East And North Africa State Vulnerability To Terrorism Index
Long-Term Political Outlook
Table: Iran – Recently Imposed Sanctions
Domestic Security Overview
Armed Forces And Government Spending
Weapons Of Mass Destruction
Table: Background Brief – Iran’s Nuclear Programme, 2002-2008
Arms Trade Overview
Industry Trends And Developments
Table: Key Players In Iran’s Defence Sector
Procurement Trends And Developments
Industry Forecast Scenario
Table: Iran’s Armed Forces, 2000-2009 (’000 personnel, unless otherwise stated)
Table: Iran’s Defence Personnel – Manpower Available For Military Services, 2009-2016 (aged 16-49, unless otherwise stated)
Table: Iran’s Government Defence Expenditure, 2009-2016
Table: Defence Expenditure Scenarios – Changing % Of GDP, 2009-2016 (US$mn)
Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario
Table: Iran – Economic Activity, 2011-2016
China Great Wall Industry Corporation
Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant
Aerospace Industries Organization
Ammunition & Metallurgy Industries Group
Defence Industries Organization
Iran Electronics Industries
How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts
- China Great Wall Industry Corporation
- Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant
- Aerospace Industries Organization
- Ammunition & Metallurgy Industries Group
- Defence Industries Organization
- Iran Electronics Industries