Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 2

  • ID: 1762685
  • Book
  • 992 Pages
  • Elsevier Science and Technology
1 of 4
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define.  Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
  • Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory
  • Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation
  • Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making
  • Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
Note: Product cover images may vary from those shown
2 of 4

Preface to Volume 2

Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva)

Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb)

Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster)

Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera) 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).

Note: Product cover images may vary from those shown
3 of 4

Loading
LOADING...

4 of 4
Arrow, Kenneth J.
Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, emeritus; a CHP/PCOR fellow; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is the joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at 51. In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves. His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information. He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mid-1980s.
Sen, A.
Suzumura, Kotaro
Note: Product cover images may vary from those shown
5 of 4
Note: Product cover images may vary from those shown
Adroll
adroll