The Causes and Consequences of the Aluminum MOU (R. Higgins, et al.).
Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (A. Dick).
Distinguishing Participants from Nonparticipants in a Price–fixing Conspiracy: Liability and Damages (R. Blair & R. Romano).
Durable Goods, Maintenance, and Tying Arrangements (W. Shughart).
Market Power in Aftermarkets (B. Klein).
The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing (R. Blair & W. Page).
Breakfast at the Federal Trade Commission (W. Shughart, et al.).
Econometric Market Delineation (D. Scheffman & P. Spiller).
The Nuts and Bolts of Antitrust Analysis: Some Thoughts on How to Develop the Facts (D. Kaplan).
Market Share and Market Power in Merger and Monopolization Cases (D. Cameron & M. Glick).
Measuring Market Power When the Firm has Power in the Input and Output Markets (K. Hylton & M. Lasser).
The Demsetz Postulate and the Welfare Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries (L. Froeb, et al.).
Monopoly and the Problem of the Economists (W. Shughart).