Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs. The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust. Wiley Series in Managerial Economics

  • ID: 2214532
  • Book
  • 190 Pages
  • John Wiley and Sons Ltd
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Modern antitrust, an outgrowth of industrial organization, has grown from a nineteenth–century American issue aimed at economic phenomena – but derived from mixed political and legal origins – to a more global concern. Highly publicized legal cases involving corporations such as Microsoft, General Electric, Eastman Kodak and Toys ′R′ Us have made us increasingly aware of how important and influential economists are in the area of modern antitrust law. Contributions in this book, by internationally–renowned authors, aim to increase the awareness and understanding of the work of economists in antitrust law. The contributions derive not just from academic analysis of industrial organization issues, but also from the authors′ work in dozens of antitrust legal proceedings on behalf of the government, private plaintiffs and private defendants. Topics covered include the role of economists in issues of antitrust liability, market power, market definition and, finally, the effect of economists on antitrust – and vice versa.
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Introduction: The Demand for and Supply of Economics in Modern Antitrust (F. McChesney).

The Causes and Consequences of the Aluminum MOU (R. Higgins, et al.).

Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (A. Dick).

Distinguishing Participants from Nonparticipants in a Price–fixing Conspiracy: Liability and Damages (R. Blair & R. Romano).

Durable Goods, Maintenance, and Tying Arrangements (W. Shughart).

Market Power in Aftermarkets (B. Klein).

The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing (R. Blair & W. Page).

Breakfast at the Federal Trade Commission (W. Shughart, et al.).

Econometric Market Delineation (D. Scheffman & P. Spiller).

The Nuts and Bolts of Antitrust Analysis: Some Thoughts on How to Develop the Facts (D. Kaplan).

Market Share and Market Power in Merger and Monopolization Cases (D. Cameron & M. Glick).

Measuring Market Power When the Firm has Power in the Input and Output Markets (K. Hylton & M. Lasser).

The Demsetz Postulate and the Welfare Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries (L. Froeb, et al.).

Monopoly and the Problem of the Economists (W. Shughart).
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Fred McChesney
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