Games and Information. An Introduction to Game Theory. 4th Edition

Description: What may be the most successful introductory game theory textbook ever written is now available in its fourth edition. Since it first published in 1989, successive editions have made its presentation ever more elegant, with incisive problem sets and applications.

Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information, 4e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material completely up-to-date, adds new end-of-chapter problems and classroom games, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website, featuring problem solutions and teaching notes: [external URL]

With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e provides an accessible first course for students in backgrounds as diverse as economics, business, mathematics, and political science.

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