U.S. Regulated Payment Stablecoin Market Size and Forecast, 2026-2031: An $82 Billion Market Where Distributors Take the Largest Share of the Reserve Income

U.S. regulated-track payment stablecoins totalled $81.92 billion in October 2026 and are forecast to reach $164.77 billion by 2031, a 15% CAGR in the base case, while the distributors that hold the customer take the largest share of the reserve income these balances earn.

In October 2026, regulated-track payment stablecoins in the United States totalled $81.92 billion and are forecast to reach $164.77 billion by 2031, a 15% CAGR in the base case. On September 24, 2026, the Federal Reserve proposed reserve, capital and application rules for the stablecoin issuers it supervises under the GENIUS Act. It was the last federal banking agency to propose its rules before the Act takes effect on January 18, 2027.

The distributors that hold the customer, rather than the issuer, take the largest share of the reserve income these balances earn. At current bill rates, they receive $1.47 billion to $1.86 billion of $3.42 billion a year, more than Circle, the largest regulated-track issuer, retains.

The 60-page report segments the market by distribution model, by charter route and by who keeps the reserve income. It prices the routes a bank can take against a nonbank issuer that rents its distribution. It profiles 15 companies, including Circle, Tether, Paxos, Coinbase, PayPal, Ripple and Anchorage Digital, with 12 charts, 10 data tables and three scenarios to 2031.

Report Highlights:

• Distributors take the largest share of the spread: Of the $3.42 billion a year in reserve income earned on $81.92 billion of U.S. regulated-track stablecoin balances, $1.47 billion to $1.86 billion goes to the distributors that hold the customer rather than to the issuer. That is 43% to 54% of the total, depending on how Circle's undisclosed costs split, against the 34% Circle retains. At Circle's realised 3.5% return, the figure is $1.23 billion to $1.56 billion.
• In the base case, the regulated market doubles by 2031 while total supply is flat today: Regulated-track balances are forecast to rise from $81.92 billion in 2026 to $164.77 billion by 2031, a 15% CAGR. The report sizes conservative, base and optimistic scenarios year by year to 2031, extended to 2036. Total USD-pegged stablecoin supply, by contrast, was down 0.17% in 2026 to October 19.
• In the base case, customer-owners gain share without taking over: Distributor-commissioned, issuer-direct and bank-owned coins are forecast to gain share of regulated-track balances by 2031, while USDC, placed through rented distribution, keeps the majority. The report forecasts each segment's size and share by year; USDC's issuer, Circle, saw its national trust bank receive final OCC approval in July 2026.
• Capital is the small cost; distribution and rates decide which route pays: The Federal Reserve's proposed operational-risk capital charge costs a Board-supervised issuer about 20 basis points of balance a year. That is a small fraction of what Circle pays its distributors. Whether a bank's own coin out-earns the average deposit turns on the Treasury bill yield and on whether the bank owns its distribution or buys it; the report gives the bill-rate break-even for each route.
• Two open decisions could reset the numbers: the final yield rule and the largest coin: If the OCC and the Federal Reserve finalise their third-party yield presumption as proposed, and it reaches rewards-paying distributors, it could put at issue the USDC rewards Coinbase pays holders, equal to 17.8% of Circle's reserve income. Tether's USDT, $183.45 billion held outside the regulated perimeter, would change the market's size materially if it entered; the report's scenario matrix sizes the market with it inside.

This report will provide answers to the following questions:

• How large is the U.S. regulated payment stablecoin market in 2026, and how large will it be by 2031 in the conservative, base and optimistic scenarios?
• Of the reserve income regulated-track balances earn, how much goes to the distributors that hold the customer, and how much do the issuers keep?
• What do the Federal Reserve's GENIUS Act proposals require of the issuers it supervises, and what does their capital charge cost against what issuers pay for distribution?
• Which route pays for a bank - an own-client stablecoin subsidiary, bought distribution, deposits or tokenized deposits - and at what Treasury bill rate does each break even?
• Which segments gain share of regulated-track balances by 2031, and how much does USDC keep?
• How far could the third-party yield presumption reach rewards-paying distributors, and what is at issue if it does?
• How would the market's size change if Tether's USDT entered the regulated perimeter?

Methodology

Our analysis originates from primary research - direct interviews with executives, operators, and technical practitioners actively shaping these markets. This fieldwork provides access to perspective and data not available in secondary sources: what decision-makers are observing in real time, the problems driving purchasing behavior, and where they see value migrating. Every data point and claim undergoes human verification before inclusion; figures that cannot be substantiated or traced to credible sources are excluded.

Market sizing triangulates across multiple independent estimation methods, producing investment-grade estimates with assumptions documented explicitly so readers can evaluate the underlying logic, stress-test key inputs, and defend the numbers in boardrooms and diligence processes. We validate quantitative claims against peer-reviewed research, regulatory filings, and observable market signals - including systematic searches for contradicting evidence. Where methods produce divergent estimates, we investigate the source of variance and report ranges rather than false precision. Forecasts are constructed through scenario modeling anchored to base rates from comparable markets. (While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, forward-looking statements reflect current expectations and are subject to risks, uncertainties, and assumptions that may cause actual results to differ materially.)

The result is thesis-driven analysis that delivers clear conclusions: specific enough to cite, transparent enough to verify, comprehensive enough to satisfy diligence requirements, and rigorous enough to withstand the follow-up question.

Target Audience

• Bank and credit union strategy, treasury and product executives weighing stablecoin issuance or tokenized deposits
• Payment companies, exchanges and wallet providers that distribute stablecoins
• Stablecoin issuers and national trust charter applicants
• Digital-asset, fintech, venture and private equity investors
• Asset managers and custodians that manage or hold stablecoin reserves
• Legal, compliance and policy advisers working on the GENIUS Act rules